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Lightfoot: Employment Law

EMPLOYMENT LAW

INTERPRETING THE FAIR LABOR
STANDARDS ACT: DIRTY DEEDS DONE
DIRT CHEAP IN McCUNE v. OREGON
SENIOR SERVICES
I.

INTRODUCTION

In McCune v. Oregon Senior Services/ the Ninth Circuit
held that a group of domestic service employees were excluded
from minimum wage coverage under the Fair Labor Standards
Act of 1938 (FLSA) as they performed companionship services
for the elderly and infirm.2 The employees would have been entitled to minimum wage if the services they performed fell
within an exception to the FLSA's companionship services exemption. a The Ninth Circuit based its decision on the Secretary
of Labor's interpretation of the 1974 amendments to the FLSA.4
1. McCune v. Oregon Senior Services, 894 F.2d 1107 (9th Cir. 1990) (per Trott, J.,
the other panel members were Rymer, J., and Pregerson, J., dissenting).
2. McCune v. Oregon Senior Services, 894 F.2d at 1108-11. See 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-19
(1988), for text of the FLSA.
The plaintiffs originally brought their claim when the federal minimum wage was
$3.35 an hour. 29 C.F.R. § 552.100 (1989). Minimum wage was $3.35 an hour from January I, 1981 to April I, 1990. 29 U.S.C. § 206(a)(l) (1988 and Supp. 1990). It was raised to
$4.25 an hour on April I, 1991. 29 U.S.C. § 206(a)(1) (Supp. 1990).
3. McCune, 894 F.2d at 1108-09. If the court had found the attendants were
"trained personnel" or performed "general household work" according to 29 C.F.R. §
552.6 (1989), the attendants would have been entitled to minimum wage under the
FLSA. Id. at 1109-11. See infra note 54 for text of 29 C.F.R. § 552.6 (1989).
4. McCune, 894 F.2d at 1108. 29 U.S.C. § 206(0(2) (1988 and Supp. 1990) provides:
Any employee who in any workweek (A) is employed in domestic service in one or more households, and (B) is so employed for more than eight hours in the aggregate, shall be
paid wages for such employment in such workweek at a rate
not less than the wage rate in effect under subsection (b) of
this section.
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The court found that these domestic service workers were not
trained personnel and were merely employed in a companionship services capacity.1i Therefore, they were not covered by
minimum wage provisions as the FLSA does not guarantee minimum wage to employees who are domestic companions. a
II. FACTS
The plaintiffs worked as full-time, live-in attendants7 for
29 U.S.C. § 206(b) (1988) states, in part:
Every employer shall pay to each of his employees. . . who in
any workweek is engaged in commerce or in the production of
goods for commerce, or is employed in an enterprise engaged
in commerce . . . and who is such work-week is brought
within the purview of this section by the amendments made to
this chapter by the Fair Labor Standards Amendments of
1974, wages at the following rate: Effective after December 31,
1977 not less than the minimum wage rate in effect under subsection (a)(l) of this section.
29 U.S.C. § 206(a)(1) (1988) states, in part:
Every employer shall pay to each of his employees who in any
workweek is engaged in commerce or in the production of
goods for commerce, wages at the following rates: (1) . . .
[NJot less than $2.65 an hour during the year beginning January 1, 1978, not less than $3.10 an hour during the year beginning January 1, 1980, and not less than $3.35 an hour after
December 31, 1980 . . . .
This statute was revised in 1988. See supra note 2.
Congress specifically determined that domestic service workers affect commerce, and
are therefore entitled to minimum wage. 29 U.S.C. § 202(a) (1988). See also, H.R. REP.
No. 913, 93rd Cong., 2d Sess. 120, reprinted in 1974 U.S. CODE CONGo & ADMIN. NEWS
28ll, 2821, (hereinafter Legislative History).
5. McCune, 894 F.2d at 1109-10.
6. Id. at nos. The FLSA does not extend minimum wage protection to " any employee employed on a casual basis in domestic service employment to provide babysitting or any employee employed in domestic service employment to provide companionship services for individuals who (because of age or infirmity) are unable to care for
themselves . . . . " 29 U.S.C. § 213(a)(15) (1988).
The court observed that the attendants would enjoy FLSA minimum wage coverage
'if they qualified as "trained personnel" or provided "general household work," the only
two exceptions to the companionship services exemption. McCune. 894 F.2d at ll08-09.
7. McCune v. Oregon Senior Services, 894 F.2d ll07. 1108 (9th Cir. 1990). Many of
the plaintiffs were Certified Nursing Assistants ("CNAs"). McCune v. Oregon Senior
Services, 643 F. Supp. 1444, 1449 (D. Or. 1986). CNAs receive 60 hours of formal training
in various areas such as nutrition, personal hygiene. body mechanics, and elimination.
Brief for Appellants at 35, McCune v. Oregon Senior Services, 894 F.2d ll07 (9th Cir.
1990) (Nos. 88-3843 and 88-6332 PAl (citing OR. ADMIN. R. 851-20-ll3 (1985)). See also
infra notes 24-35 and accompanying text for related background discussion.
The attendants contended that they were required to be present at their client's
homes for 18 to 20 hours a day. McCune V. Oregon Senior Services. 643 F. Supp. 1444,
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elderly and infirm people who were unable to care for themselves. s Two sub-agencies of the Oregon Department of Human
Resources (DHR) administered the in-home care programs and
funding. 9
The attendants performed a variety of daily services for clients including cooking, cleaning, hygiene, and medical care. 10
There were three types of. domestic service employment that
were relevant to the attendants' claim. l l The attendants' rate of
pay was determined by the specific type of work performed. 12
Many of the hours that the attendants worked were paid at
$1.50 to $1.55 per hour,13 which was less than the federal minimum wage. 14
The attendants brought suit against the defendants Ui in
1447 (D. Or. 1986).
8. McCune, 894 F.2d at 1108. The in-home care recipients had limited financial resources. Brief for Appellants at 6, McCune v. Oregon Senior Services, 894 F.2d 1107 (9th
Cir. 1990) (Nos. 88-3843 and 83-6332-PA). The maximum monthly income was $326.70
for a disabled person to be a recipient of the live-in attendant program; income above
that level had to be given to the State. [d. See also OR. ADMIN. R. 4610-05-922 and 46106-105 (1985).
Plaintiffs worked under individual contracts with the State. McCune, 894 F.2d at
1111.
9. McCune v. Oregon Senior Services, 643 F. Supp. at 1445. The two subagencies of
DHR were the Senior Services Division (SSD) and the Adult and Family Services Division (AFSD). [d.
10. McCune, 894 F.2d at 1108. Although the opinion of the Ninth Circuit did not
list the attendants' duties, the opening brief filed on their behalf indicates that the attendants cleaned house, did laundry, shopped, prepared and cleaned up after meals,
transported, and bathed and dressed clients. Brief for Appellants at 16.
Further, the opening brief states, "when plaintiffs perform household cleaning, it is
not dusting a Waterford crystal collection; plaintiffs' household chores involve cleaning
up feces, urine and vomit. Their so-called 'companionship services' include such job descriptions as bowel elimination." Brief for Appellants at 3'8.
11. McCune v. Oregon Senior Services, 643 F. Supp at 1446. The three types of
domestic service employment at issue were companions, housekeepers/chore persons and
personal care providers. [d. See infra notes 26-41 and accompanying text for discussion
of SSD manual provisions.
12. Brief for Appellants at 11.
13. [d.

14. McCune, 894 F.2d at 1108. The minimum wage was $3.35 an hour. [d. In addition to the hourly wage, the attendants also received room and board in their respective
client's home, which was often necessary to take proper care of the client. McCune v.
Oregon Senior Services, 643 F. Supp. at 1449. The live-in attendants were not entitled to
overtime hours because they received room and board. See 29 U.S.C. § 213(b)(21) (1988).
15. McCune v. Oregon Senior Services, 643 F. Supp. 1444 (D. Or. 1986). The defendants in this action were: the Oregon Senior Services Division (SSD); Richard Ladd and
Dexter Henderson, Administrators of the SSD; the Oregon Adult and Family Services
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United States District Court for the District of Oregon,I6 seeking
minimum wage for all hours worked pursuant to the Fair Labor
Standards Act of 1938. 17 The attendants claimed that they
should have been paid the minimum wage as their domestic service work qualified them under a 1974 FLSA amendment. 1s This
amendment guarantees minimum wage to any domestic service
worker employed in one or more households, for more than eight
hours per week. IS
The district court granted the defendants' motion for summary judgment20 based on its finding that the attendants performed companionship services, which were specifically exempted from FLSA minimum wage protection. 21 The district
Division (AFSD); Keith Putnam, Administrator of the AFSD; the Oregon Department of
Human Resources (DHR); and Leo Hegstrom, Administrator of the DHR. McCune, 894
F.2d at 1107.
16. McCune v. Oregon Senior Services, 643 F. Supp. at 1444. The attendants
brought suit under federal question jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (1989),
which provides: "The District Courts shall have original jurisdiction of all civil actions
arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States."
17. McCune v. Oregon Senior Services, 643 F. Supp. at 1445. See 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-19
(1988).
18. McCune, 894 F.2d at 1109-11. See 29 U.S.C. § 206(0(2) (1988) for text of applicable 1974 FLSA amendment.
19. Brief for Appellants at 16-24. The attendants also sought an order from the district court that would require the State to compensate them for all the hours they actually worked, rather than those hours authorized by a State agency. McCune v. Oregon
Senior Services, 643 F. Supp. at 1451 (emphasis added). The district court noted that if
the defendants knew the attendants were working mQre hours than were authorized and
did ~ot object, then the employees had to be compensated for all the hours they were
allowed to work. [d.
20. McCune, 894 F.2d at 1108. A summary judgment is properly granted when a
judge determines that a party has not alleged a genuine issue of fact, and that party is
not entitled to prevail as a matter of law. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1287 (5th ed. 1979).
21. McCune v. Oregon Senior Services, 643 F. Supp. at 1449, 1454. The district
court found that the attendants solely provided, "fellowship, care, and protection" for
their clients, and therefore were exempt from minimum wage under the companionship
services exclusion. [d. at 1448. The court did not discuss or examine the attendants'
specific job functions before it concluded that the attendants performed companionship
services. [d. at 1448-49. The court noted the attendants would "enjoy minimum wage
coverage only if they fit within the trained personnel or general household exceptions."
[d. at 1449.
The court determined that the attendants' CNA training did not qualify the attendants as "trained personnel" as the CNA course did not, "provide the depth of training
required for RNs or LPNs." McCune v. Oregon Senior Services, 643 F. Supp. 1444, 1449
(D. Or. 1986). The "on-the-job" training that the attendants received did not qualify
them for minimum wage. [d. at 1450. The court observed that the attendants might be
performing tasks that they were forbidden from performing according to Oregon regulations. [d. at 1449-50. The court did not want to "reward" the attendants with minimum
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court also determined that the attendants did not fall under either the trained personnel or the general household work exceptions to the companionship exclusion. 22 The attendants appealed
.
the district court's decision. 23
III.
A.

BACKGROUND
OREGON'S IN HOME SERVICE PROGRAM

The State of Oregon provides in-home service care for elderly, blind, and disabled people who qualify for public assistance. 24 This program allows the elderly and 'infirm to stay in
their own home, receive personal care, and avoid
hospitalization. 25
The Oregon Senior Services Division (SSD) establishes and
maintains policies for compensating in-home domestic service
employees and the Adult and Family Services Division (AFSD)
makes the actual payments. 26 The SSD establishes the pay
scales and job descriptions for each type of domestic service. 27
wage if they were violating Oregon's regulations. Id. at 1450. The court noted that if the
attendants' informal training qualified the attendants for minimum wage, the state
would suffer from an "administrative nightmare." Id. Further, the court refused to estop
the defendants from raising the general household work exemption. Id. at 1451.
22. McCune v. Oregon Senior Services, 643 F. Supp. 1444, 1451 (D. Or. 1986).
23. McCune v. Oregon Senior Services, 894 F.2d 1107 (9th Cir. 1990).
24. McCune v. Oregon Senior Services, 643 F. Supp. 1444, 1446 (D. Or. 1986). Inhome care service for the elderly or infirm is not unique to Oregon. Nearly every state in
America offers some type of government assisted home service care for aged and disabled
people. Telephone interview with Ms. Francis Contreras, U.S. Department of Health and
Human Services - Medicaid Division (December 5, 1990). For example, California offers
low-cost, government assisted in-home care service for individuals who cannot afford formal medical institutionalization. See Bonnette v. California Health & Welfare Agency,
704 F.2d 1465 (9th Cir. 1983).
There are only 12 states (including the District of Columbia) that do not provide
federally assisted home care service programs for the aged and disabled. Letter from Ms.
Francis Contreras to the author (December 6, 1990) (listing national home and community based health service programs).
25. McCune, 643 F. Supp. at 1446. Thus, the high costs of formal medical institutionalization are alleviated for the state and the recipient. McCune v. Oregon Senior
Services, 894 F.2d 1107 (9th Cir. 1990).
26. McCune v. Oregon Senior Services, 643 F. Supp. at 1446.
27. Id. at 1447. "Companionship services were paid $1.50 per hour, to a maximum of
$361.00 per month. Housekeeping services were paid $3.55 per hour, the current minimum wage, to a maximum of $140.00 per month. Personal care services were paid $3.55
per hour. Most live-in domestic employees could earn up to $646.00 per month." Id. The
attendants received pay for a maximum of eight hours a day, and many of the hours
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The SSD outlines its policies in a manual which the AFSD
utilizes to calculate the state domestic workers' wage rates. 28
Prior to 1985, the SSD manual provided for four types of inhome service employees: (1) homemaker; (2) companionship; (3)
housekeeper/chore; and (4) personal care. 29 In April 1985, SSD
changed its policies to include only two types of in-home employment services: Activities of Daily Living (ADL) and Self.
Management Activities (SMA).sO
According to the pre-1985 policies outlined in the SSD manual, a domestic worker performed companionship services by
providing fellowship and protection for an aged or mentally infirm person who could not care for their own needs. 31 The major
purpose of companionship service was to be there for the client;
the job did not require specialized training or provide for specific duties. 32 Housekeeper/chore services included basic housekeeping tasks, such as housecleaning, food shopping, laundry
and meal service. s3 Personal care service was designed to maintain, strengthen, or restore an individual's functioning. 3 • Only
Certified Nursing Assistants (CNAs) who passed a sixty-hour
training course could provide personal care services, which included giving baths to the client, assisting with medication, and
maintaining catheters and colostomy bags. 3~
wO.rked were only paid at the rate of $1.50 per hour. Brief for Appellants at Ii, McCune
v. Oregon Senior Services, 894 F.2d 1107 (9th Cir. 1990). (Nos 88-3843 and 83-6332-PA).
These rates "depended on the type of service, rather than the attendant's qualifications." [d.
28. Brief for Appellants at 11. See a/so, id. at 7.
29. McCune v. Oregon Senior Services, 643 F. Supp. at 1446.
30. [d. See infra notes 36-41 and accompanying text for discussion of amended policies. The new and old policies outlined in the SSD manual were relevant as the plaintiffs
worked during a time period when both policies were in effect. McCune v. Oregon Senior
Services, 643 F. Supp. at 1446.
31. McCune v. Oregon Senior Services, 643 F. Supp. at 1447 (citing Oregon SSD
manual at 11).
32. [d.

33. [d. Housekeepers were required to have at least sixteen hours of training, including first aid, home safety and maintenance, and an orientation to working with the
elderly. [d. at 1446 (citing Oregon SSD manual at 12-17).
34. [d. at 1447 (citing Oregon SSD manual at 23). These tasks were performed when
the individual's condition was stabilized, but continued medical (RN) supervision was
necessary. [d.
35. [d. Personal care service did not include skilled nursing services which were prescribed by a physician and supervised by a registered nurse. [d. (citing Oregon SSD manual at 23-30). The job classification "homemaker" was not relevant to the instant case.
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After April 1, 1985,36 in-home employment services were
classified into two categories. 37 The first, ADL, included assistance with eating, dressing, personal hygiene, mobility, bowel
and bladder care. 38 The second, SMA, included medication management, transportation, meal preparation, shopping and household maintenance. 39 ADL tasks were to be paid at $3.55 per
hour,40 and SMA tasks were to be paid either $3.55 per hour or
$1.55 per hour, depending on whether the attendant was covered
by an FLSA provision that required the attendant be paid the
federal minimum wage. 41
B.

THE FAIR LABOR STANDARDS ACT OF 1938

1.

General Applicability

The Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 (FLSA)42 regulates
various employer-employee areas such as minimum wage,43
equal pay,H overtime pay,45 and child labor.46 The FLSA was
Id. at 1446. See supra note 29 and accompanying text.
36. McCune v. Oregon Senior Services, 643 F. Supp. at 1446.
37. Id. These new rules also divide ADL and SMA into three levels, according to the
client care needed for each activity. Id. at 1447.
38. Id. See aLso OR. ADMIN. R. 411-30-020(1) (1985).
39. OR. ADMIN. R. 411-30-020(31) (1985). Caseworkers assess the client's ADL and
SMA needs for different activities. McCune v. Oregon Senior Services, 643 F. Supp. at
1447. There are maximum monthly hours that can be spent for ADL and SMA at the
three care levels; a more dependent client would lead to more hours authorized for each
activity. Id. See aLso OR. ADMIN R. 411-30-022 (1985). The new and old rules limited the
domestic service employees' work to eight hours per day. McCune v. Oregon Senior Services, 643 F. Supp. at 1447.
40. McCune v. Oregon Senior Services, 643 F. Supp. at 1447. There was a slight
increase in this rate when a client required the highest care level. OR. ADMIN. R 411-30022(2)(b)(A)(iii) (1985).
41. McCune v. Oregon Senior Services, 643 F. Supp. at 1447 (citing OR. ADMIN. R.
411-30-022(2)(b)(A)(iii) (1985)). The district court recognized that some employees may
be covered by 29 U.S.C. § 206(f)(l) (1988) which states that any employee:
who in any workweek is employed in domestic service in a
household shall be paid wages at a rate not less than the wage
rate in effect under subsection (b) of this section unless such
employee's compensation for such service does not ... constitute minimum wages for the purposes . . . of such Act.
42. 29 U.s.C. §§ 201-19 (1988).
43. 29 U.S.C. § 206 (1988). See supra note 4.
44. 29 U.S.C. § 206(d) (1988) provides:
(1) No employer having employees subject to any provisions of
this section shall discriminate, within any establishment in
which such employees are employed, between employees on
the basis of sex by paying wages to employees in such estab-
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designed to protect certain groups within the labor force being
paid substandard wages and working excessive hours." Workers
the FLSA intended to aid included the unprotected, unorganized, and lowest paid members of the nation's population. 48 Initially, however, some of the nation's lowest paid employees were
not afforded minimum wage protection under the FLSA.49 FLSA
amendments subsequently extended minimum wage coverage to
many of those low-paying occupations. llo

lishment at a rate less than the rate at which he pays wages to
employees of the opposite sex in such establishment for equal
work . . . .
45. 29 U.S.C. § 207 (1988) provides:
(a)(l) Except as otherwise provided in this section, no employer shall employ any of his employees who in any workweek is engaged in commerce Of in the production of goods for
commerce . . . for a workweek longer than forty hours unless
such employee receives compensation for his employment in
excess of the hours above specified at a rate not less than one
and one-half times the regular rate at which he is employed.
46. 29 U.S.C. § 212 (1988) provides, "(a) No producer, manufacturer, or dealer shall
ship or deliver for shipment in commerce any goods produced in an establishment situated in the United States in or about which within thirty days prior to the removal of
such goods therefrom any oppressive child labor has been employed . . . ."
47. See H.R. REP. No. 913, 93rd Cong., 2d Sess. 120, reprinted in Legislative History
at 2811-13. See also, Fair Labor Standards Act, [June) L.R.R.M. (BNA) No. 392 at 2136 (June 6, 1987). Congress found that substandard wages and working excessive hours
endangered the employees' mental and physical health and impeded the free flow of
goods through interstate commerce. Id.
48. See Brooklyn Sav. Bank v. O'Neil, 324 U.S. 697 (1945) (night watchman for a
business substantially devoted to production of interstate goods was entitled to FLSA
protection), reh'g denied, 325 U.S. 893 (1945).
49. See H.R. REP. No. 913, 93rd Cong., 2d Sess. 120, reprinted in Legislative History
at 2813-14. See also, Fair Labor Standards Act, [June) L.R.R.M. (BNA) No. 392 at 21
(June 6, 1987). The Wage and Hour Manual documented the evolution of the FLSA:
The laws relating to employment standards which were enacted prior to 1933 were limited to (1) employees of the Government itself, (2) work performed for the Government by private contractors, and (3) private employment in a few specific
industries. And, until the 1930's, the legislation put on the
books dealt only with hOUfS of work.
Congress intended the FLSA to extend minimum wage to workers engaged in or having
an affect on interstate commerce in order to maintain "minimum standards of living
necessary for health, efficiency, and well-being of workers . . . . " H.R. REP. No. 913, 93rd
Cong., 2d Sess. 120, reprinted in Legislative History at 2811.
50. Fair Labor Standards Act Amendments of 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-601, 80 Stat. 830
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 29 U.S.C).
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FLSA Domestic Service Worker Amendment of 1974

In 1974, the FLSA was amended to extend minimum wage
protection to domestic service workers.tll
a. Amendment Exemptions
Congress enacted specific exemptions to the 1974 amendment which excluded certain domestic workers from minimum
wage protection. 52 Domestic service workers employed as babysitters on a casual basis or companions for the aged and infirm
were specifically exempted from FLSA minimum wage
protection. 53
Domestic employment on a "casual basis" and the scope of
"babysitting services" and "companionship services for the aged
or infirm" are defined in the Code of Federal Regulations
(CFR).54
51. See H.R. REP. No. 913, 93rd Cong., 2d Sess. 120, reprinted in Legislative History
at 2813-14. See 29 U.S.C. § 206 (1982). This amendment was enacted as Congress determined that domestic service employees performed functions that affected interstate commerce. 29 U.S.C. § 202(a) (1988). Congress observed, "It is the intent of this committee to
include within the coverage of the Act all employees whose vocation is domestic service."
H.R. REP. No. 913, 93rd Cong., 2d Sess. 120, reprinted in Legislative History at 2845.
Workers affected by the 1974 amendments were domestic service workers, federal, state,
and public employees, telegraph agency employees, and hotel and restaurant workers in
Puerto Rico and the Virgin Islands. [d. at 2820-21.
The enactment of the Fair Labor Standards Amendments of 1974 culminated a
four-year effort to increase the minimum wage and expand coverage under the FLSA.
Fair Labor Standards Act, [Junej L.R.R.M. (BNA) No. 392 at 35 (June 6, 1987). Congress thereby included domestic service employees in the class of workers covered by the
FLSA. Marshall v. Rose, 616 F.2d 102 (4th Cir. 1980) (night watchmen who performed
domestic services in addition to patrolling were entitled to minimum wage under the
FLSA).
52. 29 U.S.C. § 213 (1988).
53. 29 U.S.C. § 213(a)(15) (1988). Congress exempted these workers because they
were not regular breadwinners or responsible for supporting a family. H.R. REP. No. 913,
93rd Cong., 2d Sess. 120, reprinted in Legislative History at 2845.
54. 29 C.F.R. §§ 552.1-.110 (1989). The three specific terms are defined and discussed at 29 C.F.R. §§ 552.3-.6 (1989). 29 C.F.R. § 552.3 defines domestic service employment as:
[Sjervices of a household nature performed by an employee in
or about a private home of the person by whom he or she is
employed. The term includes employees such as cooks, waiters, butlers, valets, maids, housekeepers, governesses, nurses,
janitors, laundresses, caretakers, handymen, gardeners, footmen, and grooms and chauffeurs of automobiles for family use.
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The Secretary of Labor determined that the "casual basis"
limitation only applied to the babysitting exemption,lIl1 Therefore, a babysitter's employment that is intermittent or irregular
is excluded from FLSA minimum wage protection,II6 However, if
babysitting is the permanent vocation of the domestic worker,
then the employee will be afforded minimum wage coverage
under the FLSA,II7 A casual babysitter who performs limited
household work unrelated to the children would not be entitled
to FLSA minimum wage protection,II8
This section "includes babysitters employed on other than a casual basis," and disclaims
itself as "illustrative, not exhaustive." 29 C.F.R. § 552.3 (1989). 29 C.F.R. § 552.4 defines
babysitting services as:
[T]he custodial care and protection, during any part of the 24
hour day, of infants or children in or about the private home
in which the infants or young children reside. The term
babysitting services does not include services relating to the
care and protection of infants or children which are performed
by trained personnel, such as registered, vocational, or practical nurses.
This section does not remove these specially trained people from the category of a covered domestic servant, "when employed in or about a private household." 29 C.F.R. §
552.4 (1989). 29 C.F.R. § 552.5 defines the term casual basis when applied to babysitting
services as:
[E]mployment which is irregular or intermittent, and which is
not performed by an individual whose vocation is babysitting.
Casual babysitting services may include the performance of
some household not related to caring for the children, provided, however, that such work is incidental and does not exceed 20 percent of the total hours worked on the particular
babysitting assignment.
29 C.F.R. § 552.6 explains that the term 'companionship services' includes:
[T]hose services which provide fellowship, care, and protection
for a person who, because of advanced age or physical or
mental infirmity, cannot care for his or her own needs. Such
services maY'include household work related to the care of the
aged or infirm person such as meal preparation, bed making,
washing of clothes, and other similar services. They may also
include the performance of general household work: provided
however, that work does not exceed 20 percent of the total
weekly hours worked. The term 'companionship services' does
not include services relating to the care and protection of the
aged or infirm which require and are performed by trained
personnel, such as a registered or practical nurse.
The CFR is the general body of regulations governing the practice and procedure of
federal administrative agencies, including the Department of Labor. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 233-34 (5th ed. 1979).
55. 29 C.F.R. § 552.5 (1989).
56. Id.
57.Id.
58. 29 C.F.R. § 552.6 (1989). See supra note 54 for full text of 29 C.F.R. § 552.6
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The Secretary further interpreted the FLSA to exempt
those workers who perform companionship services for the aged
or infirm from minimum wage protection, unless the employees
fit under a specific exception. 69 The Secretary found that a
"companion" is a worker who provides fellowship, care, and protection for an individual because that person is either aged, or
physically or mentally infirm.60 Further, a companion does not
change job status by performing limited general household work
that is unrelated to the aged or infirm person. 61
b. Amendment Exemption Exceptions
The Secretary of Labor determined that the FLSA provides
two exceptions to the "casual basis" and "companionship services" exemptions. 62 First, there is a "trained personnel" exception to the companionship services exemption that will qualify a
worker for minimum wage coverage under the FLSA.63 The Secretary indicated that registered or practical nurses are examples
of the types of workers that fall within the "trained personnel"
exception. 64
Second, a general household work exception, is applicable to
both the casual babysitting and companionship services exemptions. 66 The Secretary of Labor determined that if a domestic
worker performed general household work for over twenty percent of the total weekly hours worked, and this work was unrelated to the care of the baby or aged person, the FLSA required
that those hours be paid at the minimum wage. 66
(1989). Congress further stated: "The fact that persons performing casual services such
as baby-sitters or services as companions do some incident of household work does not
keep them from being casual baby-sitters or companions for purposes of this exclusion."
H.R. REP. No. 913, 93rd Cong., 2d Sess. 120, reprinted in Legislative History at 2845.
59. 29 C.F.R. § 552.6 (1989). See supra note 54.
60. 29 C.F.R. § 552.6 (1989). See supra note 54.
61. 29 C.F.R. § 552.6 (1989). See supra note 54.
62. 29 C.F.R. § 552.5-6 (1989). See supra note 54.
63. 29 C.F.R. § 552.6 (1989). See supra note 54. "Trained personnel" perform services for aged and infirm clients which require performance by trained personnel. 29
C.F.R. § 552.6 (1989).
64. 29 C.F.R. § 552.6 (1989). See supra note 54.
65. 29 C.F.R. § 552.5-6 (1989). See supra note 54.
66. 29 C.F.R. § 552.6 (1989). See supra note 54.
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JUDICIAL INTERPRETATION OF GENERAL FLSA PROVISIONS

The courts have liberally interpreted the FLSA to extend
minimum wage protection to a large number of employees. 67 For
example, in Tony and Susan Alamo Foundation v. Secretary of
Labor,68 the Court found that a religious foundation constituted
a business enterprise,69 that its members who contributed "services" were employees70 and awarded minimum wage under the
FLSA.71 The Ninth Circuit has also liberally interpreted the employer-employee definition to find an employment relationship
existed for a group of agricultural workers.72 The Ninth Circuit
noted that the determination of whether an employment relationship existed depended on all of the circumstances of the
work activity rather than the presence of anyone dispositive
factor.73
In A.H. Phillips, Inc. v. Walling," the Supreme Court observed that the FLSA is "humanitarian and remedial legislation."711 Further, the Court determined that FLSA exemptions
should be narrowly construed in order to meet the legislative

67. See Tony and Susan Alamo Found. v. Secretary of Labor, 471 U.S. 290 (1985).
See infra notes 68-82 and accompanying text.

68. 471 U.S. 290 (1985). The Court observed that the FLSA should be interpreted
and applied broadly to comport with congressional intent. Id. at 297 (citing Mitchell v.
Lublin, McGaughy & Assoc., 358 U.S. 207, 211 (1959) (Court found that non-executive
employees of an architectural firm affected interstate commerce and were entitled to
minimum wage».
69. Id. at 296-98.
70. Id. at 299-302.
71. Id. at 306.
72. Real v. Driscoll Strawberry Assoc. Inc., 603 F.2d 748 (9th Cir. 1979) (agricultural
workers sought minimum wages under the FLSA). In Driscoll Strawberry, the court
found an employer-employee relationship existed between strawberry growers and a
berry contracting corporation under the FLSA despite individual employment agreements indicating the growers were "independent contractors." Id. at 756. The Ninth Circuit utilized an "expansive interpretation" of FLSA definitions, "in order to effectuate
the broad remedial purposes of the FLSA and found that an employer-employee relationship existed." [d. at 754. The case was remanded to the district court to determine
which of the workers were covered by the FLSA in light of the Ninth Circuit's finding
that an employment relationship existed. [d.
73. [d. at 754.
74. 324 U.S. 490 (1945) (employees who worked in a warehouse and central office
that serviced a chain of retail stores sought minimum wage under the FLSA even though
not all their work affected interstate commerce).
75. Phillips, 324 U.S. at 493.
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purposes of the FLSA.76
The Court observed that the specific nature of the employees' work must be examined on a case by case basis to determine
if the employees were entitled to minimum wage. 77 The Court
noted that the employees in Phillips were engaged in interstate
commerce and were not exempt from minimum wage under the
FLSA retail service exemption. 7s
The Ninth Circuit followed the rationale in Phillips in deciding Worthington u. Icicle Seafoods, Inc ..79 The Ninth Circuit
76. Id. The Supreme Court noted that the legislative intent behind the FLSA was to
narrowly construe its exemptions in order to give full effect to the FLSA's purpose. Id. at
493. In Phillips, the Court relied on President Franklin D. Roosevelt's May 24, 1934
message to Congress reg~rding the purpose of the FLSA. Id. The President stated, "The
Fair Labor Standards Act was designed to extend the frontiers of social progress by insuring to all our able-bodied working men and women a fair day's pay for a fair day's
work." Id.
The Court determined that the employees were engaged in interstate commerce and
that the nature of the employees' tasks did not "fall within either the terms or spirit of
the exemption . . . . " Id. at 498. Justice Murphy, writing for the Court, observed:
Any exemption from such humanitarian and remedial legislation must therefore be narrowly construed, giving due regard
to the plain meaning of the statutory language and the intent
of Congress. To extend an exemption to other than those
plainly and unmistakably within its terms and spirit is to
abuse the interpretive process and to frustrate the announced
will of the people.
Phillips, 324 U.S. at 498.
See also Powell v. United States Cartridge Co., 339 U.S. 497, 517 (1950) (exemptions
to the FLSA minimum wage provisions construed to find that employees of a government munitions factory were not exempt from FLSA minimum wage under the government employee exemption). Justice Burton observed, "[E)mployees not thus exempted ... remain within the Act." Id. at 517. The FLSA exempts employees under
contract with the United States from its minimum wage protection. 29 U.S.C. § 206 (e)(l)
(1988). However, the Court determined that the workers were independent contractors,
not "employees of the United States," and awarded them minimum wage. United States
Cartridge, 339 U.S. at 504-06. The Court also interpreted the FLSA to qualify the munitions produced as "goods," even though the munitions were only to be delivered to their
"ultimate consumer," the United States. Id. at 512-15.
77. Phillips, 324 U.S. at 492-94, 498. See also Marshall v. Intraworld Commodities
Corp., 89 Lab Cas. 49,269 (E.D.N.Y. 1980) (district court specifically examined the various tasks that the worker performed in order to determine if his work was exempt under
the FLSA).
78. Phillips, 324 U.S. at 494-98. See 29 U.S.C. § 213(a)(2) (1988). This FLSA provision exempts any employee who works for a retail or service establishment if more than
fifty percent of that establishment's annual dollar volume of sales of goods or services is
made within the state where the establishment is located. Id.
79. 749 F.2d 1409 (9th Cir. 1979) (Icicle I) (maintenance employees aboard a fish
processing barge sued to recover over 8000 overtime hours under the FLSA overtime
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observed that labels or titles were not controlling in determining
whether an employee was exempt from FLSA minimum wage
provisions. 80 Rather, the Ninth Circuit found that the character
of the work performed and the capacity in which one is principally employed are the standards for determining whether an
employee is covered by the FLSA.81 Therefore, an employer can
r.ely on an FLSA exemption only if it can be shown that the
employees fit "plainly and unmistakably" within the terms of
the exemption. 82
The circuit courts have also determined that FLSA miniprovision). In the Icicle cases, the employer argued that the employees were exempt from
FLSA coverage according to 29 U.S.C § 213 (a)(5) (1978) (employee that catches, takes,
propagates, harvests, cultivates, or farms fish, shellfish, crustacea, seaweeds and other
aquatice life and is exempt from FLSA minimum wage provisions). See 29 U.S.C. § 213
(a)(5) (1978) which states that an employee is exempt from FLSA minimum wage if they
are employed in, "Catching, ... harvesting, cultivating or farming any kind of fish,
shellfish. . . or other aquatic forms of .animal and vegetable life, or in the first processing, canning, or packing such marine products at sea as an incident to, or in conjunction
with, such fishing operations . . . . " The Ninth Circuit noted that FLSA exemptions
were to be narrowly construed in order to ensure workers maximum coverage. Icicle II,
774 F.2d at 352.
80. Icicle II, 774 F.2d at 352-53.
81. Id. at 352-53. In Icicle II, the court observed that, "One does not become a
seaman under the FLSA [exemption] merely by performing services aboard a vessel on
navigable waters." Id. at 353.
82. Icicle II, 774 F.2d at 352. The Ninth Circuit determined that the employees in
Icicle II primarily performed industrial duties and the occasional maritime duties they
performed did not significantly aid navigation of the vessel. Id. at 353. The court found
these employees performed non-exempt work. Id.
The Supreme Court observed that the determination of the specific nature of an
employee's job is an issue of fact. Walling v. General Indus. Co., 330 U.S. 545, 546 (947)
(Wage-Hour administrator sought to enjoin an employer from violating FLSA overtime
provisions; employees were engineers in a'power plant). The Court noted that the district
court properly viewed the evidentiary facts in determining that the employees were not
entitled to minimum wage based on the executive exemption. General Industries, 330
U.S. at 550. The district court heard all of the evidence, made special findings of fact,
and thereafter concluded that the employees were not covered by the FLSA according to
the executive exemption. Id. at 546-47. The Ninth Circuit has followed this finding. See
Hoyt v. General Ins. Co. of America, 249 F.2d 589 (1957) (employee worked as an insurance company inspector and sought unpaid overtime compensation).
The Ninth Circuit noted that the issue of whether an employee was exempt from
any FLSA provision was ultimately a question of fact to be decided by the trier of fact.
Id. at 590. The executive exemption excludes any bona fide administrative or professional employee. 29 U.S.C. § 213 (a)(l) (1988). In Hoyt, the employee's job duties included inspecting boilers and machinery that his employer insured. Hoyt, 249 F.2d at
590. The court found that the employee was an administrative employee and therefore
exempt from the FLSA. Id. See also Wainscoat v. Reynolds Elec. & Eng. Co., Inc. 471
F.2d 1157 (9th Cir. 1973) (Operations and Drilling Rig Superintendents sought unpaid
overtime wages under the FLSA).
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mum wage exemptions do not apply to a worker who performs
both exempt and non-exempt activities in the same work week. s3
In Hodgson u. Wittenburg,s. the Fifth Circuit noted that performance of both exempt and non-exempt work during the same
work week defeats any exemption that would otherwise apply.slI
83. Skipper v. Superior Dairies, Inc., 512 F.2d 409, 411 (5th Cir. 1975); Brennan v.
Six Flags Over Georgia, 474 F.2d 18, 19 (5th Cir. 1973); Hodgson v. Wittenburg, 464 F.2d
1219, 1221 (5th Cir. 1972). See infra notes 84-89 and accompanying text for discussion of
these cases. Generally, employees who work "in agriculture" are exempt from FLSA minimum wage coverage. 29 U.S.C. § 213(a)(6) (1988). But see Farmers Reservoir & Irrigation Co. v. McComb, 337 U.S. 755, 762-63 (Court extended the statutory definition of
agriculture to embrace a primary and secondary concept of agriculture, one which was
exempt from FLSA coverage and the other which was non-exempt), reh'g denied. 338
U.S. 839 (1949). The Court found that the employees performed agricultural activities
under both concepts and awarded them minimum wage under the FLSA. Id. Various
circuit courts have also awarded minimum wage in situations where an employer
processed some of his sugar cane for agriculture (exempt under the FLSA), and the balance of his sugar cane for non-agricultural purposes (non-exempt under the FLSA).
NLRB v. Tepper, 297 F.2d 280 (10th Cir. 1961); NLRB v. Olaa Sugar Co., 242 F.2d 714
(9th Cir. 1957); Calaf v. Gonzalez, 127 F.2d 934 (2nd Cir. 1942); and Bowie v. Gonzalez,
117 F.2d 11 (1st Cir. 1941) (sugar cane processing employees found not to be employed
"in agriculture"; therefore covered by FLSA minimum wage provisions). See also NLRB
v. Tovera Packing Co., 111 F.2d 626 (9th Cir. 1940) (minimum wage awarded where employees worked in feed pens of a meat packing plant which serviced both stock ranch
animals, an exempt service, and animals ready for conditioning and fattening, a nonexempt service).
84. 464 F.2d 1219 (5th Cir. 1972) (Secretary of Labor sued an employer on behalf of
some agricultural workers to recover unpaid minimum wages and to enjoin the employer
from violating various FLSA provisions).
85. Hodgson, 464 F.2d at 1221. See "also Brennan v. Six Flags Over Georgia. 474
F.2d 18, 19 (5th Cir. 1973) (amusement park workers sought minimum wage for all the
hours they worked as maintenance workers and general park employees). In Six Flags,
the court found that amusement park maintenance workers who did small, new construction jobs were entitled to be paid minimum wage, even though the FLSA exempts
amusement and recreational establishment employees. Id. at 19. As the amusement park
employees performed some exempt general amusement park work during the season and
non-exempt maintenance work throughout the year, they were "covered fully" by the
FLSA minimum wage provisions. Id. The court noted that, "The nature of the work is
what gives rise to the need for an exemption; the exemption is not a subsidy accorded to
an employer because of his principal activity." Id.
See also Skipper v. Superior Dairies, 512 F.2d 409 (5th Cir. 1975) (dairy deliveryroute man sued his former employer under the FLSA to recover back overtime wages for
the entire period of his employment). In Superior Dairies, the employer asserted that
the employee was exempt from FLSA minimum wage coverage according to 29 U.S.C. §
213(b)(12) (1972), which exempts any employee in agriculture from the FLSA overtime
provisions at 29 U.S.C. § 207 (1972). Id. at 411. The employee in Superior Dairies delivered various dairy products to grocery and convenience stores. Id. at 410-11. The employer did not own any cows, or produce any dairy products. Id. at 411. The Fifth Circuit
determined that the employee did not perform activities that were related to "dairying"
and agriculture. Superior Dairies, 512 F.2d at 411-12. The Fifth Circuit concluded that
even if the deliveryman performed dairying or agricultural duties, he would not be ex-
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In Hodgson, the employees were primarily engaged in the handling, care and feeding of livestock that were purchased at auction for immedia te resale. 86 Such isolated activities fell within
the FLSA agric'Jlture exemption. 87 However, the court determined that the employees also performed non-agricultural work
that was unrelated to operating a livestock auction. 88 Therefore,
the Fifth Circuit found that the nonexempt activities of the employees made the agricultural exemption inapplicable and
awarded minimum wage. 89
.D.

JUDICIAL INTERPRETATION

OF THE 1974 DOMESTIC WORKER

AMENDMENTS

The 1974 FLSA Domestic Service Worker Amendments 90
have been construed to extend minimum wage to various groups
of laborers.91 The District Court of Puerto Rico held that workers who provided services normally performed by family members were entitled to minimum wage coverage under the
amendment. 92
empt from the FLSA as he also performed non-exempt work activities. [d. The court
observed, "Nor does it make any difference that the employee is doing mixed work. In
any week that any particular employee does some non-exempt work he is covered fully,
not pro-rata." [d. at 411 (citing Six Flags, 474 F.2d at 19). See also infra notes 92-96 and
accompanying text.
86. Hodgson v. Wittenburg, 464 F.2d 1219, 1222-23 (5th Cir. 1972). In 1961, Congress enacted a "specific and limited (FLSA) exemption" for employees who are also
engaged in livestock auctions. [d. at 1221. See 29U.S.C. § 213(b)(13) (1988).
87. 29 U.S.C. § 213(a)(6) (A) (1972). The court examined the language of 29 U.S.C. §
213(a)(6)(A) (1972). Hodgson, 464 F.2d at 1223. Any employee in agriculture is exempt
from the FLSA if the employee is employed by an employer who did not, during any
calendar quarter during the preceding calendar year, use more than 500 man-days of
agricultural labor. See 29 U.S.C. § 213(a)(6)(A) (1972).
88. Hodgson, 464 F.2d at 1221.
89. [d. at 1223.
90. 29 U.S.C. § 213(a)(15) (1988).
91. Marshall v. Cordero, 508 F. Supp. 324 (D.C. Puerto Rico 1981) (minimum wage
extended to domestic worker who performed babysitting services, cleaned the employer's
house and raked the employer's yard). See infra notes 92-102.
92. Marshall v. Cordero, 508 F. Supp. 324 (D.C. Puerto Rico 1981). In Cordero, the
district court reasoned that the intent of Congress was to extend minimum wage to those
people who performed home-related, noncommercial labor in private family homes that
were normally and traditionally carried out by family members. [d. See Marshall v.
Rose, 616 F.2d 102 (4th Cir. 1980). Night watchmen who performed extra domestic services such as answering the phone, checking for mechanical or electrical failures, walking
the dogs and watching the grandchildren in addition to their patrolling duties were
granted minimum wage for hours spent doing extra duties). The dispute in Rose developed when the employer did not want to pay the watchmen minimum wage for time
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In Marshall u. Intraworld Commodities Corp.,93 the New
York Eastern District Court held that a part-time domestic
worker was not exempt as a "casual" babysitter and awarded
him minimum wage. 9 • The court observed that the employee
performed additional domestic service duties including cooking,
cleaning, washing and ironing clothes, raking the yard, and caring for the employer's children. 9~ The court determined that
these non-exempt services entitled the worker to minimum wage
for all the hours worked, including the time spent performing
services which might otherwise fall under the "casual basis"
babysitting exemption. 96
The companionship services exemption to the 1974 FLSA
Amendments was raised in Bonnette u. California Health &
Welfare Agency.97 In Bonnette I, a group of domestic service
attendants who cared for elderly and 'infirm clients sought unpaid minimum wage payments from the California State Health
and Welfare Department. 98 The district court fQund that
whether the domestic service attendants provided mere "companionship services" to the disabled recipients of public assistance was an issue of fact. 99 Five years later, in Bonnette u. California Health & Welfare (Bonnette II),t°o the district court
found that the plaintiff "chore workers" were entitled to minispent doing additional domestic services. Rose, 616 F.2d at i03-04. After specifically examining the additional duties the watchmen performed and the intent of Congress, the
district court noted that watchmen are specifically covered by the FLSA. [d. at 104. The
court reasoned that the FLSA domestic service provision should be broadly construed so
that the watchmen were entitled to minimum wage for the additional domestic services
they provided. [d.
93. 89 Lab. Cas. 49,269 (E.D.N.Y. 1980).
94. [d. at 49,272-73.
95. [d. at 49,271.
96. [d. at 49,272. See Lopez v. Roderiguez, 668 F.2d 1376 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (full-time,
live in domestic housekeeper and babysitter awarded unpaid minimum wages under the
FLSA).
97. 414 F. Supp. 212 (N.D. Cal. 1976) (Bonnette I). Bonnette [ involved various
motions for summary judgment. [d. See infra notes 98-102 and accompanying text.
98. Bonnette [, 414 F. Supp. at 212. The State moved for summary judgment, asserting that the attendants were exempt from FLSA minimum wage provisions as they
were companions to the aged and infirm. [d.
99. [d. at 214. The court determined that there was a triable issue of fact as to the
amount of time the attendants devoted to general household work and it denied the
motions for summary judgment. [d.
100. 525 F. Supp. 128 (N.D. Cal. 1981) (Bonnette Il). The court observed, "Plaintiffs have filed several amended complaints and withstood a motion to dismiss . . . . " [d.
at 134.
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mum wage according to the FLSA domestic service provision. lol
The court determined that extending FLSA provisions to these
"chore workers" provided them with a reasonable wage and ensured the continued viability of the in-home care program. 102
IV. THE COURT'S ANALYSIS
A.

THE MAJORITY OPINION

In McCune v. Oregon Senior Services,103 the Ninth Circuit
majority held that domestic service employees who provided inhome support services for elderly and infirm clients were not entitled to receive minimum wage. 104 The court determined that
the attendants were mere companions, and did not· possess the
requisite training to warrant minimum wage protection. 1011
1.

The Companionship Service Exemption

The Ninth Circuit first considered whether the companionship service exemption applied to the attendants. loa The court
101. Bonnette II, 525 F. Supp. at 139.
102. Id. at 13~. The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's finding, however, the
issue of whether the employees were exempt from FLSA minimum wage was not raised.
Bonnette v. California Health and Welfare Agency, 704 F.2d 1465 (9th Cir. 1990).
103. McCune v. Oregon Senior Services, 894 F.2d 1107 (9th Cir. 1990).
104. McCune, 894 F.2d at 1109·10. The Ninth Circuit majority found that the attendants were domestic service employees, but were not entitled to minimum wage coverage as they performed work that was exempted. McCune, 894 F.2d at 1108-09.
105. McCune, 894 F.2d at 1111.
106. Id. at 1107-09. The Ninth Circuit was asked to decide whether the "not casual"
limitation of the FLSA applied only to babysitters and not companions as the lower
court had determined. Id. at 1109. Although this issue had not been raised in the district
court, the attendants argued successfully that review of the issue was appropriate. Brief
for Appellants at 12-13, McCune v Oregon Senior Services, 894 F.2d 1107 (9th Cir. 1990)
(Nos. 88-3843 and 83-6332·PA). The attendants asserted four reasons why review of the
"not casual" limitation was proper. Id. First, the "not casual" issue had been raised peripherally when the FLSA's legislative history relative to all minimum wage exemptions
was argued and the district court partially based its ruling on it. [d. Second, the parties
would not be required to develop new facts. Id. Third, the "not casual" issue involved a
pure question of law. Id. Fourth, the constitutionality of the court's ruling and of the
interpretive regulation posed a significant question of general impact. Id. Therefore, on
appeal, the Ninth Circuit reviewed five issues to determine if the district court erred in
granting the defendants' motion for summary judgment. McCune, 894 F.2d at 1107.
The Ninth Circuit reviewed the appeal de novo. [d. at 1109. De novo is defined as
"trying a matter anew; the same as if it had not been heard before and as if no decision
had previously been rendered." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 392 (5th ed. 1979). Summary
Judgments based on statutory construction, are reviewed de novo by the appellate court.
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determined that the attendants provided companionship services according to the Secretary of Labor's definition.lo7 The majority opined that public policy favored not applying the companionship exemption to the attendants as they were often
required to work under unattractive conditions. lOS However, the
majority noted that in-home care recipients might not receive
critical care if the State was required to pay minimum wage. I09
The Ninth Circuit majority concluded that the attendants
should seek to redress their claim through the legislative branch
of the government; not through the judicial. 110 Accordingly, the
attendants were exempt from federal minimum wage coverage
unless they were found to be excepted from the exemption. l l l
2.

The Casual Limitation Exemption

The majority then noted that the "casuallimitation,"ll2 exemption applied to babysitters,113 but not to companionship services. 114 Therefore, the companionship exemption applied to the
Turner v. McMahon, 830 F.2d 1003 (9th Cir. 1987) (appellate courts must review a grant
of summary judgment that construes the Social Security Act to afford overtime payments to workers de novo), cert denied, 488 U.S. 818 (1988).
107. McCune, 894 F.2d at 1109-10. See also, 29 C.F.R. § 552.4-6 (1989), see supra,
note 54. The court considered the statutory exemptions to the 1974 FLSA amendment
which required domestic service workers be paid minimum wage. McCune, 894 F.2d at
1109-10. See supra note 6. The court then relied on the Secretary of Labor's interpretation of these exemptions. McCune, 894 F.2d at 1110-11.
108. McCune, 894 F.2d at 1109-10.
109. [d. at 1110. The court noted that, "Critical services [performed by the appellants) reach more elderly or infirm individuals ... because the care-providers are exempt from the FLSA." [d.
110. [d. at 1110. The court observed, "Appellants must petition the Secretary [of
Labor) or Congress for the remedy they seek." [d.
Ill. [d. at 1109-11. See 29 U.S.C. § 213(a)(15) (1988).
112. McCune, 894 F.2d at 1109-11. The court relied on 29 U.S.C. § 213(a)(15) (1988).
See supra note 6. Further, the court relied on 29 C.F.R. § 552.106 (1989), which states in
part: "The 'casual' limitation does not apply to companion services." McCune, 894 F.2d
at 1110.
113. McCune, 894 F.2d at 1110. The court relied on the domestic service exemptions
at 29 U.S.C. § 213(a)(15) (1988). See supra note 6 for the "casual limitation" language.
114. McCune, 894 F.2d at 1110. The Ninth Circuit noted that the Secretary of Labor's definition of "companionship services" was not "unreasonable in light of Congressional mandate." [d. at 1110. The court reasoned that when Congress delegates authority
to an agency to explain a statute by regulation, such regulations are controlling, "unless
they are arbitrary, capricious, or manifestly contrary to the statute." [d. (citing Chevron
U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 467 U.S. 837, 843-44 (1984) (Environmental Protection Agency's definition of "stationary source" found to be a permissible
construction of language from the Clean Air Acts Amendments of 1977». The Ninth
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attendants even though they were employed on more than a casual basis. llIi
3. The Exceptions to the Exemptions
The majority found that the attendants did not qualify for
minimum wage coverage under the "trained personnel" or "general household work" exceptions to the FLSA.1l6 Relying on legislative history, the majority determined that Congress intended
that only registered nurses and licensed practical nurses qualified under the "trained personnel" exception.l17 The majority
concluded that because the attendants who were CNAs received
only sixty hours of formal medical training they were not entitled to FLSA minimum wage protection under the "trained personnel" exception.llS
The general household work exception was found to not apCircuit also relied upon a Supreme Court decision that found, "As long as the agency's
construction is reasonable, it must be upheld." [d. (citing Connecticut Dep't of Income
Maintenance v. Heckler, 471 U.S. 524, 532 (1985) (Medicaid Act definitions of different
medical facilities held not to be mutually exclusive».
115. McCune, 894 F.2d at 1110. The court noted that the attendants "Jive with their
clients at a near poverty level providing around-the-clock care." [d. The court also discussed the attendants' argument that the legislative history of the FLSA exempted casual babysitters and companions as these workers "are not regular breadwinners or responsible for their families' support." [d. See also, H.R. REP. No. 913, 93rd Cong., 2d
Sess. 120, reprinted in Legislative History at 2845. The attendants argued unsuccessfully
that Congress did not intend the provision to apply to them as they are breadwinners.
McCune, 894 F.2d at 1110. However, the court did not find a breadwinner/nonbreadwinner distinction because Congress's statements about a breadwinner being excepted from
the exemption "are merely policy justifications," and not a determining factor in assessing if minimum wage was due." [d. The court noted that, "The plain language of the
statute does not make this breadwinner/nonbreadwinner distinction . . . . " [d.
Relying on Congressional intent, the attendant argued that the purpose of the FLSA
was to provide coverage for "all employees whose vocation was domestic service . . . . "
H.R. REP. No. 913, 93rd Cong., 2d Sess. 120, reprinted in Legislative History at 2845.
Attendants argued unsuccessfully that if vocational babysitters (caretakers of the young)
were covered, then vocational caretakers of the elderly or infirm should be covered also.
McCune, 894 F.2d at 1HO; see also Brief for Appellants at 12-13, 23-26, McCune v.
Oregon Senior Services, 894 F.2d 1107 (9th Cir. 1990) (Nos. 88-3843 and 83-6332-PA).
116. McCune, 894 F.2d at 1110-11.
117. [d. The court relied on the following language: "The exemption reflects the
intent of the committee tQ exclude from coverage. . . companions for individuals who are
unable because of age and infirmity to care for themselves. But it is not intended that
trained personnel, such as nurses, whether licensed or practical, shall be excluded." McCune, 894 F.2d at 1111, (citing H.R. REP. No 913, 93rd Cong., 2d Sess. 120, reprinted in
Legislative History at 2845).
118. [d.
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ply to the attendants as their "general household" duties were
directly related to the care of the recipients.1I9 The majority determined that such household work was not considered "general
household" work under this exception. 120 Further, the majority
noted that even if an otherwise exempt "companion" performed
general household work, he would still be exempted from minimum wage coverage if the general household work was incidental to the recipient's care. 121 The Ninth Circuit majority determined that the attendants' household work was incidental. 122
B.

THE DISSENTING OPINION

Dissenting, Judge Pregerson asserted that the purpose of
the FLSA was to extend minimum wage protection broadly to a
large number of workers.123 He noted that a logical extension of
the Supreme Court's holding in Philli pS 124 was that exceptions
119. Id. See supra note 54 for the text of 29 C.F.R. § 552.6 (1989).

120. McCune, 894 F.2d at 1111 (citing H.R. REP. No. 913, 93rd Cong., 2d Sess. 120,
reprinted in Legislative History at 2845). See also supra note 6 and accompanying text.
121. McCune, 894 F.2d at 1111. The court relied on 29 C.F.R. § 552.6 (1989). See
supra note 54 for the text of 29 C.F.R. § 552.6 (1989). The work is incidental work if it
does not exceed twenty percent of the total weekly hours worked. McCune, 894 F.2d at
1111.
122. McCune, 894 F.2d at 1111. The court relied on the Congressional comment,
"The fact that persons performing casual services as baby-sitters or services as companions do some incident of household work does not keep them from being casual babysitters or companions for purposes of this exclusion." Id. (citing H.R. REP No. 913, 93rd
Cong., 2d Sess. 120, reprinted in Legislative History at 2845).
Finally, the majority held that the attendants had to be compensated for all hours
the State of Oregon permitted them to work. McCune, 894 F.2d at 1111. However, the
court refused to impute the knowledge of hours worked from the individual recipients to
the State, even though the State and care recipients were deemed joint employers. Id. at
1111-12. See Bonnette v. California Health & Welfare Agency, 704 F.2d 1465 (9th Cir.
1981) (State and in-home care recipients were joint employers). In Bonnette, the court
did not determine whether the recipient's knowledge of hours worked should be imputed
to the state. Id. The Ninth Circuit noted that knowledge of the total hours worked could
be imputed under a general agency theory. McCune, 894 F.2d at 1111. However, the
court observed that allowing the in-home care recipients to control the number of hours
their attendants worked, and then forcing the State to pay for those hours was inappropriate, and would remove much of the control from the agencies in charge of administrating the in-home care program. Id. at 1111-12.
123. McCune v. Oregon Senior Services, 894 F.2d 1107, 1112-14 (9th Cir. 1990)
(Pregerson, J., dissenting).
124. Id. at 1113. Judge Pregerson noted that Congress intended the FLSA to
broaden, not narrow the number of workers eligible for minimum wage coverage. Id. See
supra notes 74-78 and accompanying text for a discussion of Phillips.
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to the FLSA exemptions should be broadly construed. m
Further, Judge Pregerson asserted that the majority misapplied definitions from the Code of Federal Regulations 126 to the
employees. 127 He urged that if the employees provided substantial domestic service or received significant formal training in a
domestic service area, they were entitled to receive minimum
wage. U8
Judge Pregerson reasoned that many of the attendants received the requisite formal training needed to qualify as trained
personnel. 129 According to the dissent the majority erred in determining that the legislative examples of a "registered or practical nurse" were the only types of domestic service workers that
Congress intended to qualify as "trained personnel" for FLSA
minimum wage protection. 130 The majority completely disregarded the attendants' CNA training as it was not as extensive
as that received by a registered nurse or licensed practical
nurse. 13l Judge Pregerson contended that by ignoring the plaintiffs' training, the majority was overlooking the realities of a rapidly changing health care industry where many patients are
forced to rely on practically trained medical personnel. 132
Judge Pregerson also urged that the attendants' work was
clearly neither casual nor strictly companionship in nature. 133
Relying on legislative history, he asserted that the attendants'
duties went far beyond basic chores such as preparing meals or
washing diapers. 13 • He further urged that the labor regulations
125. McCune, 894 F.2d at 1113. Judge Pregerson relied on President Franklin D.
Roosevelt's May 24, 1934 message to Congress. See supra note 74.
126. McCune, 894 F.2d at 1113-14. Judge Pregerson further relied on 29 C.F.R. §§
552.1-6 (1989). See supra note 54 for text of 29 C.F.R. §§ 552.1-6 (1989).
127. McCune, 894 F.2d at 1114.
128. [d. at 1112-14.
129. [d. at 1113. Judge Pregerson reasoned that the CNA attendants received sixty
hours of formal medical training so they should not to be exempted as mere companions
or habysitters. [d. at 1112-14.
130. [d.
131. McCune,894 F.2d at 1112-14.
132. [d. Judge Pregerson observed, "The argument that CNA attendants are not
trained for purposes of minimum wage coverage smacks of elitism. This conclusion is by
no means dictated by the language of the regulation." [d.
133. [d. at 1112-14.
134. [d. at 1112-13. Judge Pregerson observed:
The babysitter/companion exemption is meant to apply to
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should not be read to exclude the attendants from mInImUm
wage protection as some of their work fell into an exempted category.m Rather, employees who performed exempt and nonexempt work activities during the same work week are entitled to
minimum wage for all of their work. 136
Judge Pregerson further contended that the majority failed
to look at the attendants' actual job functions. ls7 He asserted
that Congress intended that an employee's actual job function
and not their job title should determine whether that employee
was entitled to minimum wage. ISS Accordingly, Judge Pregerson
urged that if the majority looked at the attendants' actual job
functions, the attendants would not be disqualified from minimum wage protection under the "companionship services" exemption. ls9 Therefore, Judge Pregerson would have remanded
the case to determine whether the attendants' specific job functions and training entitled them to minimum wage. 140
part-time workers not involved in hard domestic labor who do
not look to their work as a principle means of support. The
regulation should not be read to exclude precisely those persons Congress meant to protect with the 1974 FLSA amendments. This is however, what the district court did when it
categorized (the attendants) without looking to the actual nature of the work they perform. Though simple meal preparation might be "incidental," what of specially prepared nutritional diets .. , and the administration of medication?
Though simple laundry work might be "incidental," what of
bed-pan duty, catheterization, and soiled linens and garments
for bed-ridden invalids? These duties are certainly related to
the care of the attendant's client, but are by no means incidental. The work is hard and back-breaking, requiring patience and stamina, and is critical to adequate medical care of
many elderly and disabled persons who live at home.
McCune, 894 F.2d at 1114.
135. McCune, 894 F.2d at 1113-14. See supra note 54 for text of 29 C.F.R. § 552.6
(1989), for discussion of relevant labor regulations.
136. [d. Judge Pregerson relied on Skipper v. Superior Dairies, 512 F.2d 409 (5th
Cir. 1975), Hodgson v. Wittenburg, 464 F.2d 1219 (5th Cir. 1972), and Brennan v. Six
Flags Over Georgia, 474 F.2d 18 (5th Cir. 1973). See supra notes 83-89 and accompanying text for a discussion of these cases.
137. McCune, 894 F.2d at 1113-14.
138. [d.
139. [d. at 1114.
140. [d. Judge Pregerson determined that the attendants' duties clearly lifted them
from mere companion status and entitled them to minimum wage. [d.
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CRITIQUE

In McCune,l41 the Ninth Circuit seemingly failed to adhere
to Congress' intent to extend the FLSA to a broad range of
workers l42 by denying a logical extension of minimum wage protection to the domestic service attendants in the instant case.
Historically, the courts have interpreted the FLSA and its
amendments liberally. This led to a large number of employees
qualifying for FLSA protection despite various potential exemptions. us In the instant case, the Ninth Circuit majority ignored
the principles previously established and significantly limited
FLSA minimum wage protection for domestic workers.
It has been observed that a factual determination of an employee's actual job function must be made in order to ascertain
if that employee is entitled to FLSA protection. l44 The Ninth
Circ~it followed this reasoning in determining that the employees in Icicle were entitled to minimum wage. In However, in the
instant case, the Ninth Circuit did not inquire into the attendants' actual job functions. Rather, the majority relied on labels
provided by the district court and the defendants in finding that
the attendants were companion workers. The Ninth Circuit
failed to examine whether any factual determination had been
made by the district court about the nature and quality of the
attendants' jobs before exempting them from FLSA minimum
wage protection. 146

Factually, it would seem that the attendants' job duties
were more than mere companionship services and thus the attendants should have been entitled to FLSA minimum wage
141. McCune v. Oregon Senior Services, 894 F.2d 1107 (9th Cir. 1990).
142. See supra notes 67·102 and accompanying text for a discussion of the related
FLSA wage cases. See also supra notes 42·66 and accompanying text for discussion of
FLSA and the relevant 1974 amendments.
143. See supra notes 67·102 and accompanying text.
144. Walling v. General Indus. Co., 330 U.S. 545 (1947) (Wage·Hour Administrator
sought to enjoin an employer from violating FLSA overtime provisions; employees were
engineers in a power plant). See supra notes 71·82 and accompanying text.
145. Worthington v. Icicle Seafoods, Inc., 774. F.2d 349, 353 (9th Cir. 1984). (Icicle
Il) See supra notes 76·80 and accompanying text.
146. See supra notes 77·82 and accompanying text for discussion of the importance
of determining an employee's job functions and duties in FLSA wage cases.
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coverage. 147 However, the district court improperly granted the
defendants' summary judgment without making a factual determination as to the nature and quality of the attendants' specific
job functions. 148 The Ninth Circuit failed to recognize this error.
It would have been more appropriate for the Ninth Circuit to
remand McCune to the district court to specifically review the
attendants' actual job functions. H9
Further, the attendants performed both exempt and nonexempt work. Courts have construed the FLSA to hold that if an
employee performed both exempt and nonexempt work during
the same week, then that employee was entitled to minimum
wage for all work performed. 1llo However, the attendants lost the
benefit of this FLSA construction because a factual determination was not made, and the Ninth Circuit majority erred by not
requiring a determination be made. llli
The majority properly recognized several categories of work
that were covered by the FLSA. However, the trained personnel
exception was narrowly construed. The majority accepted Congress' listed examples of trained personnel as exhaustive. 11l2
Prior court decisions suggest that the Ninth Circuit should have
considered these examples as illustrative. 11l3 An expansive interpretation would have resulted in the CNA attendants qualifying
as trained personnel. This outcome would have recognized the
vital care the CNA attendants provide and the changes in the
health care industry which have led to increased reliance on
home-based care. Likewise, the underlying purpose of the FLSA,
to protect a large group of workers, would better be served.
The second category of work, "general household work,"
was also narrowly construed. The Ninth Circuit found that the
attendants' work was "too related to the care" of the recipients,
and basically' eliminated the entire exception. The majority de147. See supra note 10 and accompanying text.
148. See supra note 21 and accompanying text.
149. See supra notes 97-99 and accompanying text.
150. See supra notes 83-89 and accompanying text. In making such determinations,
other courts have liberally interpreted what qualifies as nonexempt work. [d.
151. McCune v. Oregon Senior Services, 894 F.2d 1107, 1114 (9th Cir. 1990). See
supra notes 83-89 and accompanying text.
152. See supra note 21 and accompanying text.
153. See supra notes 72-82 and accompanying text.
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termined that the facts of this case were insufficient to establish
that the employees were engaged in nonexempt general household work. Therefore, it appears that it will be impossible for a
similarly situated employee to show that their household work
was unrelated to the care of the recipient. Consequently, the
Ninth Circuit denied minimum wage protection to a group of
workers that Congress seemingly intended to protect.
Further, the holding in McCune appears to have been result-oriented as the majority focused its concern on whether the
State of Oregon would be able to pay FLSA wages to the attendants. lll' However, it was incorrect to give primary importance to
the potential costs that the attendants' employers might have to
bear.lllll The companionship service exemption is present to prevent minimum wage from being unreasonably extended. For example, it would be unreasonable to require an elderly neighbor/
employer to pay minimum wage to a neighborhood youth who
visits weekly and helps organize the elderly person's affairs and
accompanies them grocery shopping.
The primary focus should be to protect the employees' interests; not the employers' interests. In enacting the FLSA, Congress was concerned that the unorganized and lowest paid members of this nation's work force were suffering from unfair labor
practices. 11l6 Therefore, it was inappropriate for the Ninth Circuit to give the FLSA's primary purpose secondary status by
over-extending the companionship service exemption to protect
an employer.
VI. CONCLUSION
The Ninth Circuit strictly relied upon the Secretary of Labor's definitions and the provisions of the FLSA to exempt the
attendants from minimum wage protection. 11l7 Accordingly, after
154. See supra notes 110-11 and accompanying text.
155. The State of Oregon and the in-home care recipients were determined to be
joint employers, but this was not at issue. McCune v. Oregon Senior Services, 894 F.2d
1107, 1111 (9th Cir. 1990).
156. See supra notes 42-66 and accompanying text. In light of the humanitarian and
remedial purpose of the FLSA, the McCune decision appears to defeat Congress' intent
to extend minimum wage to a broad range of workers.
157. The Ninth Circuit deferred to the Secretary of Labor's interpretation as to
whether a domestic service worker was entitled to minimum wage under the FLSA. Mc-
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McCune, domestic service employees who perform "companionship" job functions will probably be forced to seek amendments
to the FLSA in order to receive the federal minimum wage. Unfortunately, most domestic service workers do not have the resources to seek such legislative changes because they are paid
less than minimum wage. IllS Thus, the Ninth Circuit's strict adherence to the Secretary of Labor's interpretation of the FLSA
and its unwillingness to order that a determination be made as
to the attendants' job functions may be economically damaging
to a valuable, humanitarian work force. IlI9
Stephen K. Lightfoot JI*

Cune, 894 F.2d at 1110-11. Since many courts read the Secretary's definitions broadly,
and the Ninth Circuit read the Secretary's definitions narrowly, there is likely a need for
Congress to provide further legislation that will explicitly provide which domestic service
workers qualify for minimum wage. Without a definite provision, courts and employers
seemingly will be unguided in their decisions of whether the FLSA covers or excludes the
employee.
158. Telephone interview with Gayle Troutwine, Attorney for the plaintiffs, Jay McCune, et al. (September 20, 1990).
159. The McCune decision will not be overturned by the United States Supreme
Court because many of the original plaintiffs have moved from Oregon, or are no longer
interested in pursuing their claim. Telephone interview with Gayle Troutwine, Attorney
for the plaintiffs, Jay McCune, et al. (September 20, 1990).
• Golden Gate University School of Law, Class of 1992.
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